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CALIFORNIA'S UNINSURED AND
UNDERINSURED MOTORIST LAW: AN
UPDATED REVIEW AND GUIDE
Michael J. Brady* and Marta B. Arriandiagat
I. INTRODUCTION
Insurance Code section 11580.21 mandates the inclusion
of uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage in nearly
every motor vehicle insurance policy issued in the state of
California.2 Thus, almost all Californians are directly af-
* Partner, Ropers, Majeski, Kohn & Bentley; Past-President of the North-
ern California Association of Defense Counsel; B.A. 1964, Stanford University;
J.D. 1967, Harvard University.
t Associate, Ropers, Majeski, Kohn & Bentley; B.A. 1975, University of
Delaware; J.D. 1985, University of San Francisco.
1. CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2(a)(1) (West 1988 & Supp. 1996).
2. Id. The statute provides in pertinent part:
No policy of bodily injury liability insurance covering liability arising
out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of any motor vehicle, except
for policies which provide insurance in the Republic of Mexico issued or
delivered in this state by non-admitted Mexican insurers, shall be is-
sued or delivered in this state to the owner or operator of a motor vehi-
cle, or shall be issued or delivered by any insurer licensed in this state,
upon any motor vehicle then principally used or principally garaged in
this state, unless the policy contains, or has added to it by endorse-
ment, a provision with coverage limits at least equal to the limits speci-
fied in subdivision (m) and in no case less than the financial responsi-
bility requirements specified in section 16056 of the Vehicle Code
insuring the insured, the insured's heirs or legal representative for all
sums within such limits which he, she, or they, as the case may be,
shall be legally entitled to recover as damages for bodily injury or
wrongful death from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehi-
cle.... A policy shall be excluded from the application of this section if
the automobile liability coverage is provided only on an excess or um-
brella basis. Nothing in this section shall be construed to require that
uninsured motorist coverage shall be offered or provided in any home-
owner policy, personal and residents' liability policy, comprehensive
personal liability policy, manufacturers' and contractors' policy, prem-
ises liability policy, special multi-peril policy, or any other policy or en-
dorsement where automobile liability coverage is offered as incidental
to some other basic coverage, notwithstanding that the policy may pro-
vide automobile or motor vehicle liability coverage on insured premises
or the ways immediately adjoining.
Id. Section 11580.2(m) provides:
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fected by its provisions. Unfortunately, for such a common-
place body of law, these code sections are considered difficult
to interpret and understand. The result is that this fre-
quently litigated area of law is unclear even for those practi-
tioners who work in this area.
This article attempts to clarify three separate, but inter-
related areas of this law: its fundamental nature and pur-
pose, judicial interpretations of its provisions, and the legal
tension caused by the co-existence of uninsured and underin-
sured motorist benefits laws.
The following sections will discuss and analyze the vari-
ous provisions of section 11580.2 which have been the subject
of published decisions issued in California. The examination
of these decisions is intended to facilitate a better under-
standing of the basics of uninsured and underinsured (here-
inafter "UM/UIM") motorist coverage law, and to act as a
guide to the practitioner.
II. THE BACKGROUND OF UM/UIM MOTORIST LAW
A. Purpose
The basic purpose of the uninsured motorist statute is to
minimize losses to the people of California who are involved
in accidents with uninsured or financially irresponsible mo-
torists. Under the statute, at least some coverage is afforded
an insured person with injuries caused by an uninsured or
underinsured motorist.3 The effect of this statute is to guar-
antee to an insured motorist the minimum financial responsi-
bility under his or her own policy for injuries resulting from a
Coverage provided under uninsured motorist endorsement or coverage
shall be offered with coverage limits equal to the limits of liability for
bodily injury in the underlying policy of insurance, but shall not be
required to be offered with limits in excess of the following amounts:
(1) a limit of thirty thousand ($30,000) because of bodily injury to
or death of one (1) person in any one accident.
(2) subject to the limit for one person set forth in paragraph one, a
limit of sixty thousand ($60,000) because of bodily injury to or death of
two or more persons in any one accident.
CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2(m) (West 1988 & Supp. 1996).
3. Sections 11580.2(m)(1) and (2) provide for "[a] limit of thirty thousand
dollars ($30,000) because of bodily injury to or death of one person in any one
accident" and "a limit of sixty thousand dollars ($60,000) because of bodily in-
jury or death of two or more persons in any one accident." Id. § 11580.2(m)(1)-
(2).
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collision with another party who either has no automobile lia-
bility insurance or has insurance with insufficient limits.
Insurance Code section 11580.2 was enacted in 1959, re-
pealed, and then re-enacted with some changes in 1961.1 The
statute establishes as a matter of public policy that every mo-
tor vehicle liability policy that provides coverage for bodily
injuries issued in California must provide UM/UIM motorist
coverage. 5 Unless the provisions of section 11580.2 are ex-
pressly deleted by an agreement in writing between the in-
surer and the insured, such provisions become a part of every
policy issued in California that covers liability arising from
the ownership, maintenance or use of any motor vehicle.'
The statute dictates the appropriate wording for such a
waiver.7
Insurance Code section 11580.2 does not make all drivers
whole for injuries resulting from accidents with uninsured or
underinsured motorists. Instead, it ensures that those driv-
ers injured by such motorists are protected to the extent that
they would have been had the driver at fault carried the stat-
utory minimum of liability insurance.'
4. Id. § 11580.2.
5. Id. § 11580(a)(1).
6. Section 11580.2(a)(1) provides that "[tihe insurer and any named in-
sured, prior to or subsequent to the issuance or renewal of a policy, may, by
agreement in writing, in the form specified in paragraph (2), delete the provi-
sion covering damage caused by an uninsured motor vehicle. .. ." Id.
7. Section 11580.2(a)(2) provides the following specific language:
The California Insurance Code requires an insurer to provide unin-
sured motorists coverage in each bodily injury liability insurance pol-
icy it issues covering liability arising out of the ownership, mainte-
nance, or use of a motor vehicle. Such section also permits the insurer
and the applicant to delete such coverage when a motor vehicle is oper-
ated by a natural person or persons designate by name.... Uninsured
motorists coverage insures the insured, his or her heirs, or legal repre-
sentatives for all sums with the limits established by law, which such
person or persons are legally entitled to recover as damages for bodily
injury, including any resulting sickness, disease, or death, to him or
her from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle not
owned or operated by the insured or a resident of the same household.
An uninsured motor vehicle includes an underinsured motor vehicle as
defined in subdivision (p) of Section 11580.2 of the Insurance Code.
Id. § 11580.2(a)(2).
8. See id. § 11580.2(1)-(2).
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B. The Relationship Between the Insured and the Insurer
The focus of uninsured motorist law is on the relation-
ship between the injured insured and his or her auto liability
insurer. This frequently results in conflicts of interest for the
insurer. The party defending the claim for UM/UIM motorist
benefits is actually the insurer of the injured party. Thus, an
insurer seeking to deny coverage has the burden of arguing
that its own insured claimant, and not the UM/UIM motorist,
was actually responsible for the accident, or that the respon-
sible motorist was not, in fact, an UM/UIM motorist, or that
its own insured was comparatively negligent.
Therefore, a serious conflict of interest arises between an
insurer denying coverage and an insured who is making a
claim for UM/UIM motorist benefits regarding the issue of
who was at fault. On the one hand, the insurer wants to
prove that its own insured was at fault in order to defeat the
insured's claim for UMUIM motorist benefits. On the other
hand, the insurer is concurrently interested in proving that
the insured was not at fault in order to defeat any claim the
UM/IJM driver might have against the insured under the li-
ability portion of the insured's auto policy.
This focus on insured and insurer explains many of the
seeming anomalies of the statute. For example, the provision
that requires the arbitration of various major issues,9 the ex-
clusion of coverage for stipulated judgments between the in-
sured and the third party,10 and the requirement of "physical
contact"'1 and immediate reporting in hit-and-run cases 12 all
underscore the fact that the injured insured is making a
claim against his or her own insurer to recover UMIUIM ben-
efits. These provisions seek to economize this process and
avoid fraud and conflicts of interest.
Since the focal point in an UM/UIM case is the relation-
ship between the insurer and the injured insured, owners of
motor vehicles who qualify as self-insurers need not provide
UMIUIM motorist coverage.'I Any person who has registered
9. Id. § 11580.2(f).
10. Id. § 11580.2(c)(3).
11. Id. § 11580.2(b)(1).
12. Id. § 11580.2(b)(2).
13. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 16053 (West Supp. 1996).
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more than twenty-five motor vehicles can qualify as a self-
insurer by obtaining a Certificate of Self-Insurance.
14
III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 11580.2
A. Omission, Waiver or Deletion of Coverage
According to Insurance Code sections 11580.2(a)(1) and
(2), written waivers in the form set forth in the statute delete
uninsured motorist coverage. 15 These waivers are binding
14. Id.
15. CAL. INS. CODE § 11580(a)(1)-(2) (West 1988 & Supp. 1996). The follow-
ing definitions are brief but essential in providing a framework for further dis-
cussion of section 11580.2. These definitions will be discussed in more detail as
they arise in the analysis of the case law:
1. "[Blodily injury" includes sickness or disease, including death, resulting
therefrom;...
2. "[N]amed insured [as an individual]"... means the named insured and the
spouse of the named insured and, while residents of the same household, rela-
tives of either, while occupants of a motor vehicle or otherwise, heirs and any
other person while in or upon or entering into or alighting from an insured
motor vehicle and any person with respect to damages he or she is entitled to
recover for care or loss of services because of bodily injury to which the policy
provisions or endorsements apply;
3. "[Nlamed insured" [as] an entity other than an individual,.., means any
person while in or upon or entering into or alighting from an insured motor
vehicle and any person with respect to damages he or she is entitled to recover
for care or loss of services because of bodily injury to which the policy provisions
or endorsement apply....
4. "[I]nsured motor vehicle" means the motor vehicle described in the underly-
ing insured policy of which the uninsured motorist endorsement or coverage is a
part, a temporary substitute automobile for which liability coverage is provided
in the policy or a newly acquired automobile for which liability coverage is pro-
vided in the policy if the motor vehicle is used by the named insured or with his
or her permission or consent, express or implied, and any other automobile not
owned by or furnished for the regular use of the named insured or any resident
of the same household, or by a natural person or persons from whom coverage
has been deleted ....
5. "IiU]ninsured motor vehicle" means a motor vehicle with respect to the own-
ership, maintenance or use of which there is no bodily injury liability insurance
or bond applicable at the time of the accident, or there is the applicable insur-
ance or bond but the company writing the insurance ... denies coverage there-
under or refuses to admit coverage thereunder except conditionally or with res-
ervation, or an "underinsured motor vehicle," . . . or a motor vehicle used
without the permission of the owner thereof if there is no bodily injury liability
insurance applicable at the time of the accident with respect to the owner or
operator thereof, or the owner or operator thereof be unknown ....
Id. § 11580.2(b) (form altered from original).
6. "Underinsured motor vehicle" means a motor vehicle that is an insured mo-
tor vehicle but insured for an amount that is less than the uninsured motorist
limits carried on the motor vehicle of the injured person.
Id. § 115 8 0.2(p)( 2 ) (form altered from original).
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not only to continuations and renewals of the policy, but also
apply to any other policy that "extends, changes, supersedes,
or replaces the policy originally issued to the named insured
by the same insurer. "16
The uninsured motorist coverage or endorsement offered
by the insurer must provide the same liability limits of the
underlying policy of insurance, but need not exceed $30,000
for death or bodily injury to one person, or $60,000 for death
or bodily injury to two or more people. 17
In Enterprise Insurance Co. v. Mulleague,18 the appellate
court concluded that when uninsured motorist coverage is
omitted from a policy, and the insurer fails to obtain a writ-
ten waiver of uninsured motorist coverage, the policy is con-
strued by law to provide uninsured benefits equal to the bod-
ily injury liability limits of the policy, but that such benefits
will not exceed $30,000 per person and $60,000 per
accident. 19
The policy in Enterprise regarding underinsured motor-
ist benefits provided a limit of $600,000 per person and
$600,000 per accident for a commercial vehicle. 20 Although
the policy provided coverage for commercial vehicles with a
load capacity over 1500 pounds, it did not expressly provide
uninsured motorist coverage for such vehicles.21 The court
ruled that, absent a valid written waiver of coverage, the pol-
icy did include uninsured motorist coverage for these
vehicles.22
However, the court rejected the insured's contention that
the limit for such coverage was $600,000.23 Rather, the court
applied Insurance Code section 11580.2(m) to hold that the
maximum limits afforded for such coverage was $30,000 per
person. 24 According to the court's interpretation, Insurance
Code section 11580.2(m) stands for the proposition that unin-
sured motorist coverage must equal the limits of liability of
the underlying policy if those limits exceed the $15,000/
16. Id. § 11580(a)(1).
17. Id. § 11580.2(m)(1)(2).
18. 241 Cal. Rptr. 846 (Ct. App. 1987).
19. Enterprise Ins. Co., 241 Cal. Rptr. at 849.
20. Id. at 847.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 851.
23. Id. at 850.
24. Enterprise Ins. Co., 241 Cal. Rptr. at 850.
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$30,000 minimum required under the financial liability stat-
ute, but only up to a maximum of $30,000 per person or
$60,000 per accident. 25 Thus, Enterprise stands for the prop-
osition that the mere absence of UM/UIM coverage is ineffec-
tive as a waiver.
However, any named insured can still affirmatively de-
lete uninsured motorist coverage for all named insureds
under the policy.26 Under Insurance Code section 11580.2(a),
the waiver remains in effect with respect to any other policy
that extends, changes, supersedes, or replaces the policy is-
sued to the named insured by the same insurer. In other
words, the waiver continues to have a binding effect on the
subsequent policy.
Interpreting this subsection, the court in Craft v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 27 held that a grand-
father's rejection of uninsured motorist coverage on a policy
issued to himself and his granddaughter also applied to a re-
placement policy later issued to the granddaughter only.28
An effective deletion of coverage was also found in Hart-
man v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Co.2 9 The court held
that even where there is failure to recite the specific waiver
language in section 11580.2(a)(2), an agreement that did not
conform to the statutory waiver did not establish as a matter
of law that the insured had not waived uninsured motorist
coverage .30
The court explained that even if an agreement to waive
the coverage is insufficient because it does not contain the
prescribed statutory language, the insufficiency is only prima
facia evidence of an ineffective waiver of coverage. 3 1 The re-
sulting presumption is subject to rebuttal by evidence of an
intentional relinquishment of a known right after knowledge
of the facts.32 In Hartman, the trial court properly consid-
ered extrinsic evidence of waiver in determining that the
25. Id.
26. Id. at 851.
27. 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 293 (Ct. App. 1993).
28. Craft, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 299.
29. 251 Cal. Rptr. 714 (Ct. App. 1988).
30. Hartman, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 714-19.
31. Id.
32. Id.
7231996]
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agreement signed by plaintiff's decedent was a knowing and
voluntary waiver and therefore enforceable. 3
However, in Kincer v. Reserve Insurance Co. ,34 an insuffi-
cient waiver of coverage was found where the waiver was in
the preamble to the policy. In Kincer, there was nothing in
the body of the policy to indicate that uninsured motorist cov-
erage was not being furnished. 5 Further, there were no en-
dorsements attached to the policy explaining the effect of a
waiver of uninsured motorist protection.3"
An insufficient waiver was also found in Dufresne v. Elite
Insurance Co. 37 In Dufresne, the insured bought a motorcycle
and telephoned his broker to obtain liability insurance cover-
age before he drove away from the dealer's lot.38 On learning
that there was an extra premium for this coverage, the in-
sured requested the broker to sign the insured's name to a
waiver.39 The insurer did so.40 Six weeks later, the insured
was killed in a collision with an uninsured motorist.41 The
court held that the waiver was ineffective because it failed to
meet the requirement of written authority to authorize an
agent to enter into a contract required to be in writing.42 The
statutory purpose requiring that deletion of coverage be in
writing was to avoid this kind of dispute.43 The court further
held that the purported waiver lacked the necessary clarity
and specificity.44
As demonstrated by the cases cited, section 11580.2 al-
lows for changes and deletions to be made in UM/UIM cover-
age. If the statutory language for waiver is not used, this
does not necessarily mean that there has been an ineffective
waiver of UM/UIM coverage as a matter of law. Instead, it
only creates prima facia evidence of an ineffective waiver of
coverage that can be rebutted.
33. Id.
34. 90 Cal. Rptr. 94 (Ct. App. 1970).
35. Kincer, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 97.
36. Id.
37. 103 Cal. Rptr. 347 (Ct. App. 1972).
38. Dufresne, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 349.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 350.
42. Id.
43. Dufresne, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 352.
44. Id.
724 [Vol. 36
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It seems clear that the courts will look to the insured's
actual knowledge of waiver rather than require strict statu-
tory compliance. In essence, the courts properly seek to en-
force the intent of the statute. The cases above demonstrate
that usage of the statutory waiver language is preferable, but
that courts will also heed clear evidence of the insured's
knowing waiver of UM/UIM coverage.
B. Persons Covered Under Insurance Code Section 11580.2
According to Insurance Code section 11580.2(b), there
are three primary groups entitled to uninsured coverage.
The first group includes the named insured, his or her
spouse, and his or her relatives while residents of the same
household.45 This category is afforded the broadest coverage.
The statute provides that persons in this category are pro-
tected while they are occupants of a motor vehicle or
otherwise.46
The second group entitled to uninsured coverage consists
of any person in or upon or entering into or alighting from an
insured motor vehicle.47 Consequently, whether any member
of this group is entitled to uninsured motorist coverage de-
pends upon the determination of whether the vehicle was
insured.
The third group entitled to uninsured benefits is rela-
tively small. It consists of any person with respect to dam-
ages he or she is entitled to recover for care or loss of services
because of bodily injury to which the policy provisions or en-
dorsement apply.4
8
Persons in the first category are given the broadest cov-
erage. They are not even required to be occupants of the in-
sured vehicle at the time of the accident. 49 For example, a
spouse or resident relative of the named insured may be a
passenger of an uninsured common carrier, such as a bus or
cab, or in an uninsured non-owned automobile, and nonethe-
less be entitled to the required uninsured motorist coverage
under the policy issued to the named insured.50 In fact, the
45. CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2(b) (West 1988 & Supp. 1996).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. § 11580. 2(p)(4 ) (noting that the named insured may be in the vehicle
"or otherwise").
7251996]
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named insured and the insured's family need not be occu-
pants of any motor vehicle in order to be protected for injuries
inflicted by an uninsured motorist.5 1 The words "or other-
wise" in the statute indicate that these people may be occu-
pants of a streetcar or even pedestrians and still be entitled
to UM/UIM coverage. Therefore coverage for this group ex-
tends to any situation imaginable where there is contact be-
tween an insured of the above category and a vehicle driven
by an uninsured motorist.
The majority of litigation has involved the second cate-
gory of insureds, that is, "any other person while occupying
an insured motor vehicle."52 That litigation has generally
centered on defining what "an insured motor vehicle" is, be-
cause whether the vehicle is considered to be insured depends
on the status of the vehicle and not the driver.
An insured motor vehicle is defined as (1) the vehicle de-
scribed in the policy; (2) a temporary substitute vehicle; (3) a
newly acquired vehicle, if it is used by the named insured or
with his or her permission or consent; or (4) any other non-
owned vehicle operated by the named insured or his or her
spouse.53
Because of the limited scope of what an "insured motor
vehicle" is when obtaining uninsured motorist coverage,
there are relatively few cases defining the term in the unin-
sured motorist context. However, the issue of whether a ve-
hicle is an insured motor vehicle frequently arises in the con-
text of whether there is liability coverage afforded to the
insured, rather than in the context of uninsured motorist
coverage.
The description of an insured motor vehicle is generally
found in the definition section of the policy. The following de-
scription is typical, though not exclusive:
1. Any vehicle shown in the Declarations.
2. Any of the following types of vehicles on the date the
insured became the owner:
a. A private passenger auto; or
b. A pickup, panel truck or van, not used in any busi-
ness. This provision applies only if you; (a) acquire the
vehicle during the policy period; and (b) ask to insure
51. Id. § 11580.2(b).
52. Id.
53. Id.
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it within 30 days after you became the owner. If the
vehicle you acquire replaces one shown in the Declara-
tions, it will have the same coverage as the vehicle it
replaced.
3. Any trailer you own.
4. Any auto or trailer you do not own while used as a
temporary substitute for any other vehicle described in
this definition which is out of normal use because of its
breakdown, repair, servicing, loss, or destruction.
The above definitions of an insured motor vehicle help to de-
termine whether the second group of insured individuals,
consisting of "any other person," is entitled to uninsured
coverage.
As noted above, the third group of insured persons in-
cludes "any person with respect to damages who is entitled to
recover for care or loss of services because of a bodily injury to
which the policy provisions or endorsement apply."
54
In Tara v. California State Automobile Ass'n, 5 the court
held that this third category does not create a new and in-
dependent cause of action against insurance companies.56
Under the clause, a person can recover UM/UIM benefits
from an insurer "if and only if that person would be legally
entitled to recover those damages in tort directly from the
owner or operator of the uninsured vehicle." 7
In Tara, a daughter provided housekeeping services to
her mother while her mother was recuperating from injuries
resulting from a car accident with an uninsured motorist.5 8
The daughter brought suit against the insurer to recover the
value of her services. 59 The court determined that the daugh-
ter was not entitled to recover the value of those services
from her mother's insurer because the uninsured motorist
owed no duty to the daughter and the motorist's actions were
not the proximate cause of the daughter's damages.6 0 The
court further explained that the daughter's performance of
housekeeping services for her mother was too remote from
the conduct of the uninsured motorist to give rise to a cause
54. Id.
55. 155 Cal. Rptr. 497 (Ct. App. 1979).
56. Tara, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 498.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
1996] 727
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of action by the daughter against the motorist for the value of
her services.61
In sum, to determine whether uninsured coverage is
available depends upon the classification of the individual
who has been injured. Clearly, the first step in processing an
uninsured claim is to determine the individual's category.
Coverage for the first group (the named insured, his
spouse, and resident members of his family) extends to virtu-
ally any situation where there is injury caused by a non-
owned, uninsured vehicle. The insured under the first cate-
gory has the benefit of UM/UIM protection as an occupant of
an insured vehicle, of a non-owned vehicle, or even as a
pedestrian.
The determination of cases discussing the second cate-
gory of insureds (any other person while occupying an unin-
sured motor vehicle) turns on the definition of an "insured
motor vehicle."
The third group is relatively narrow. This category of
persons is only allowed to recover uninsured motorist benefits
from an insurer if they would be legally entitled to recover
those damages in tort directly from the owner or operator of
the uninsured vehicle.
C. Physical Contact Requirement
This section provides that bodily injuries resulting from
a hit-and-run accident must arise out of physical contact with
the uninsured automobile. 2 There must be physical contact
between an automobile, the owner or operator of which is un-
known, and the insured or an automobile the insured is occu-
pying.13 If there is no physical contact, the claimant is not
entitled to recover uninsured or underinsured motorist
benefits.
The purpose of the "physical contact" requirement is to
curb fraud, collusion, and other abuses arising from claims
caused by "phantom cars." Often these accidents have re-
sulted solely from the carelessness of the insured. For exam-
ple, a driver who falls asleep and hits a telephone pole might
claim he had swerved off the road to avoid being hit by an
unidentified vehicle.
61. Tara, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 499.
62. CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2(b)(1) (West 1988 & Supp. 1996).
63. Id.
728 [Vol. 36
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Cases involving physical contact fall into a variety of fac-
tual situations. However, they can be generalized to include
the following: (1) direct contact between the unidentified ve-
hicle and the insured's vehicle; (2) the unidentified vehicle
strikes a third vehicle which, in turn, contacts the insured's
vehicle; (3) some part of the unidentified vehicle or something
being carried by the unidentified vehicle strikes the insured
or the insured's vehicle; (4) the unidentified vehicle strikes an
object on the road which, in turn, contacts the insured or the
insured's vehicle; or (5) an occupant of the unidentified vehi-
cle intentionally or negligently propels or throws an object
that contacts the insured's vehicle.
In Boyd v. Interinsurance Exchange,64 the court held that
the physical contact between the uninsured vehicle and the
insured motorist or the vehicle occupied by the insured mo-
torist was an absolute condition precedent to recovery and
that there were no exceptions to this rule.65
In Boyd, the injured party crashed into a building after
swerving to avoid being hit by an uninsured motor vehicle. 6
Although the uninsured motor vehicle made no physical con-
tact with the insured or her vehicle, the accident was wit-
nessed and substantiated by three witnesses v.6  The matter
was submitted to arbitration and the insured's claim against
the insurer was denied on the ground that there had been no
physical contact. 68 The court re-emphasized that the right to
recover for the negligence of an unknown motorist is deter-
mined, under the plain terms of the statute, by whether or
not the bodily injury was caused by physical contact.6 9 Thus,
the court found that uninsured motorist benefits had been
correctly denied in spite of the fact that the insured's version
of the causative events had been substantiated.
7 0
In Barnes v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.,71 the
court held that coverage requires a direct application of force
from an uninsured motor vehicle.72 In Barnes, the insured
64. 186 Cal. Rptr. 443 (Ct. App. 1982).
65. Boyd, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 445.
66. Id. at 444.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 445.
70. Boyd, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 444-45.
71. 230 Cal. Rptr. 800 (Ct. App. 1986).
72. Barnes, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 801.
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was injured after her car collided with a box of chairs lying on
the freeway.73 The court explained that Insurance Code sec-
tion 11580.2(b) requires physical contact between the plain-
tiff's car and the unknown vehicle from which plaintiff
claimed the box fell in order to recover.7 4
In Barnes, there was no such physical contact; there was
no direct application of force from the unknown vehicle, and
the box that had caused the accident had not fallen from the
unknown vehicle onto plaintiff's car, but was lying in the
road when she hit it. 75 However, the court did imply that re-
covery would have been allowed if the insured's vehicle had
been struck by the box as it fell from the unidentified
vehicle.76
By comparison, the requisite physical contact was found
in Pham v. Allstate Insurance Co. 7 7 In Pham, a rock fell from
an unidentified dump truck, bounced on the highway, pene-
trated the windshield, and injured the occupant of an insured
vehicle. 78 The court emphasized that the collision resulted
from an uninterrupted chain of events.79 There had not been
an intervening force to break the chain of causation, and the
rock had not first come to rest before colliding with the car.80
Thus, Pham is distinguishable from Barnes because there
was no break in the causal chain.
No physical contact, and thus no UM/UIM coverage, was
found in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.
Yang.81 There, an insured was shot by an unknown occupant
of a car while he was standing in a parking lot.8 2 The court
held that the insured was not covered by uninsured motor ve-
hicle coverage, because his injuries had not been caused by
physical contact of an uninsured motor vehicle with the in-
sured.83 Instead, his injury arose out of the physical contact
73. Id.
74. Id. at 800.
75. Id. at 801.
76. See id.
77. 254 Cal. Rptr. 152 (Ct. App. 1988).
78. Pham, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 152.
79. Id. at 154.
80. Id.
81. 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 210 (Ct. App. 1995).
82. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 211.
83. Id. at 212.
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with the bullet which struck him, which was not set in motion
or propelled by the car.84
Litigation arising from the "physical contact" require-
ment under Insurance Code section 11580.2(b) stems primar-
ily from the unlimited factual situations that occur. Again,
the focus of the courts considering this requirement has been
an affirmation of the clear statutory requirement.
D. Accrual of Cause of Action
Insurance Code section 11580.2(i) specifies three alterna-
tive methods through which an insured can preserve a cause
of action under the uninsured motorist provisions of the pol-
icy. Within one year the insured must either: (1) file suit for
bodily injury against the uninsured motorist in a court of
competent jurisdiction;8 5 or (2) conclude an agreement as to
the amount due; 6 or (3) notify the insurer, by certified mail,
of the institution of arbitration proceedings.
8 7
If the insured fulfills any of the Code requirements men-
tioned above, his cause of action against the insured will be
preserved. If he does not, he cannot make a claim for unin-
sured motorist benefits.
Insurance Code section 11580.2 creates a condition for
the preservation of a potential cause of action for uninsured
motorist benefits under the policy of insurance.8 8 However,
this code section does not fix the time for instituting a civil
suit against the insurer after a cause of action has accrued.8 9
Instead, these actions are an absolute condition precedent to
claims.90
The provisions of Insurance Code section 11580.2(i) cre-
ate an absolute prerequisite to the accrual of any cause of ac-
tion against the insurer for UM/UIM benefits under the stat-
ute. The Ninth Circuit affirmed this interpretation of section
11580.2(i) in United States v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity
Co.9 1 Because the provision did not create a conventional
statute of limitations, but rather an absolute prerequisite to
84. Id. at 217.
85. CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2(i)(1)(A) (West 1988 & Supp. 1996).
86. Id. § 11580.2(i)(1)(B).
87. Id. § 11580.2(i)(1)(C).
88. Id. § 11580.2(i).
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. 460 F.2d 17, 19 (9th Cir. 1972).
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the accrual of any cause of action under the statute, the im-
munity of the United States to state statutes of limitations
did not apply.92 The failure of the federal government, as an
insured, to bring an action within one year barred its
recovery. 93
The rationale behind Insurance Code section 11580.2(i)
is that the insurer must be able to recover the benefits paid to
its insured by suing the uninsured driver who is liable for the
injuries to the insured. This recovery is only possible when
the insured has preserved that right by complying with sec-
tion 11580.2(i). The insurer is entitled to assert a cause of
action against the uninsured motorist responsible for the in-
sured's injuries. If the insured has failed to protect the statu-
tory time, the insurer has no obligation to pay uninsured mo-
torist benefits.
In Kortmeyer v. California Insurance Guarantee Ass'n,94
the court held that compliance with Insurance Code section
11580.2(i) was an absolute condition precedent to maintain-
ing a cause of action under the policy for UM benefits, irre-
spective of the insurer's insolvency.95 In Kortmeyer, a woman
whose uninsured motorist claim was denied by the liquidator
of her automobile insurer brought a declaratory relief action
against the Insurance Commissioner, as liquidator, and the
California Insurance Guarantee Association (hereinafter
CIGA) seeking allowance of her claim and a judgment declar-
ing her right to recover uninsured motorist benefits from
CIGA.96
The parties in Kortmeyer stipulated that plaintiff had not
filed a lawsuit against the uninsured motorist or made a de-
mand for arbitration against the insolvent insurer and that
no agreement was ever reached as to the amount due under
the policy.97 The court found that, absent Kortmeyer's com-
pliance with section 11580.2(i), she had no right to claim un-
insured motorist benefits against either the insolvent Coastal
Insurance Company or CIGA.98 The court emphasized that
the insured's cause of action against her insurer only accrues
92. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 460 F.2d at 19.
93. Id.
94. 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 71 (Ct. App. 1992).
95. Kortmeyer, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 74.
96. Id. at 72.
97. Id. at 75.
98. Id.
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when the insured has preserved the cause of action against
the uninsured motorist tortfeasor.99
In California State Automobile Ass'n v. Cohen,100 the
court discussed the difference between when a statute of limi-
tations begins to run and when a cause of action accrues to
make a claim for uninsured motorist benefits. 1 1 The court
explained that a cause of action accrues to an insured under
an uninsured motorist policy on the date the insured files suit
against the uninsured motorist pursuant to Insurance Code
section 11580.2(i), not on the date that the accident took
place. °2
In Spear v. California State Automobile Ass'n,10 3 the
court held that an insured's cause of action against an in-
surer, and his right to compel arbitration of his uninsured
motorist benefit claim, did not accrue, and the statute of limi-
tations did not run, until the insurer refused to arbitrate, and
not when the insured meets one of the three statutory condi-
tions set forth in section 11580.2(i). 104
The court in Spear noted that Cohen, as well as numer-
ous other cases, had correctly held that the one year period in
which the insured must act to preserve his or her cause of
action cannot be extended or tolled.'05 The court also noted
that these cases do not state that accrual occurs, and the stat-
ute of limitations begins to run, when one of the precondi-
tions of Insurance Code section 11580.2(i) is met.'06
Note that although courts are in agreement that the pro-
visions in section 11580.2(i) serve as an absolute precondition
to recovery under the uninsured motorist law, they are un-
clear as to whether this provision applies to individuals who
are making a claim to recover underinsured motorist bene-
fits.10 7 This issue will be addressed in more detail in the sec-
99. Id.
100. 118 Cal. Rptr. 890 (Ct. App. 1975).
101. Cohen, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 894-95.
102. Id. at 895.
103. 831 P.2d 821 (Cal. 1992).
104. Spear, 831 P.2d at 822.
105. Id. at 824.
106. Id.
107. Compare Arrasmith v. State Farm Ins. Co., 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 53 (Ct. App.
1994) (holding that section 11580.2(i) applies to underinsured motorist claims)
with Quintano v. Mercury Casualty Co., 36 Cal. App. 4th 104, 106 (Ct. App.
1994) (holding that section 11580.2 does not apply to underinsured motorist
claims), reh'g granted, 884 P.2d 985 (Cal. 1995).
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tion regarding the co-existence of uninsured and underin-
sured claims.
E. Requirement to Provide Notice of Limitation of Action
Where the insured is not being represented by counsel,
an insurer can only rely on the insured's failure to comply
with the one-year statute of limitations if it has notified the
insured in writing of the limitations period.' 08 Failure to do
so tolls the statute.109 In other words, an insurer whose
nonrepresented insured has a pending claim under the unin-
sured motorist coverage is required to notify its insured in
writing of the applicable statute of limitations at least thirty
days before its expiration. 110
Failure by the insurer to provide the notification tolls the
statute for a period of thirty days from the date the written
notice is actually given."' However, under section
11580.2(k), the notice is not required if the insurer has re-
ceived notice that the insured is represented by an
attorney."
2
In Pugh v. State Farm Insurance Co.," 3 the court held
that notification of attorney representation must be in writ-
ing in order to negate the insurer's obligation to give the in-
sured notice." 4 In Pugh, the trial court granted an insured's
petition to compel her insurer to arbitrate her uninsured mo-
torist claim, even though it was filed beyond the applicable
one-year statute of limitations under 11580.2(i). 115
In Pugh, the trial court entered a judgment confirming
the arbitration award given in favor of the insured." 6 The
appellate court affirmed and explained that the insured's pe-
tition to compel arbitration was not barred by the one-year
statute of limitations, because the statute was tolled by the
insurer's failure to notify the insured in writing of the statu-
tory time limitations as required by section 11580.2(k)." v
108. CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2(k) (West 1988 & Supp. 1996).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. 278 Cal. Rptr. 149 (Ct. App. 1991).
114. Pugh, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 153.
115. Id. at 149-50.
116. Id. at 150.
117. Id. at 151, 153.
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The court also held that the insured, who had not made any
statements or done anything that would lead State Farm to
believe that she was represented by counsel, was not es-
topped from claiming lack of notice.11
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.
Lykouresis,11 9 the court held that the thirty-day notice must
be in plain and understandable language, and be sufficient to
apprise the insured of the statute's expiration and how to pre-
vent it. 120 In this case, the insured was Greek and knew little
English. 121 The first notice sent by the insurer indicated that
the insured had to file a lawsuit before the date of expira-
tion. 122 The second notice corrected the statement to say that
a demand for arbitration would be sufficient, and a lawsuit
was not necessary. 123 The court ruled that the second notice
was deficient because it did not state the date by which the
demand had to be filed and that, because a lawsuit would
have tolled the statute of limitations, the notice had been
misleading. 124 Thus, the statutory time period was tolled.
125
In Davis v. Blue Cross,26 not itself an uninsured motor-
ist case, the California Supreme Court held that the insurer
had waived its right to compel arbitration when it had
breached its covenant of good faith and fair dealing by failing
to apprise the insured of her right to arbitration.' 27 The in-
surer had tried to pursue arbitration after the insured filed
suit.128 The court noted that if arbitration is to be a meaning-
ful remedy under the uninsured motorist statute, the insurer
must provide specific advice to the insured about its
availability. 129
There may exist circumstances where an insurer is not
required to provide the thirty-day notice. For instance, if the
insured does not present the claim to the insurer until just
prior to the one-year period, it is impossible for the insurer to
118. Id.
119. 139 Cal. Rptr. 827 (Ct. App. 1977).
120. Lykouresis, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 830.
121. Id. at 829.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 830.
125. Lykouresis, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 830.
126. 600 P.2d 1060 (Cal. 1979).
127. Davis, 600 P.2d at 1061.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1067.
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give the requisite thirty-day notice of Insurance Code section
11580.2(k). In this case, the failure to provide the requisite
thirty days notice would not be the fault of the insurer. Nev-
ertheless, the insurer should provide whatever notice it can
under the circumstances. For example, if the claim is first
presented twenty days before the statute expires, the insurer
can only provide notice that the statute will expire in twenty
days.
F. Arbitration
Insurance Code section 11580.2(f) provides for arbitra-
tion as follows:
The policy or an endorsement added thereto shall provide
that the determination as to whether the insured shall be
legally entitled to recover damages, and if so entitled, the
amount thereof, shall be made by agreement between the
insured and the insurer or, in the event of disagreement,
by arbitration. 130
Thus, only two matters can and must be submitted to ar-
bitration in the event of disagreement between the insurer
and the insured: (1) whether the insured is legally entitled to
recover damages; and (2) if the insured is legally entitled to
recover damages, then to what amount. 13 1 The damages re-
ferred to are the damages the insured is legally entitled to
recover from the uninsured motorist, rather than the amount
of money the insurance company must pay the insured. 13 2
The statutory requirement that these two issues be arbi-
trated cannot be reduced or limited by the policy.' 3 3 Any at-
tempt to do so will be considered void.13 4 Regardless of the
issues decided, the arbitration award, or a judgment confirm-
ing such an award, is not conclusive on any party in any sub-
sequent proceeding between the insured, his insurer, his
legal representative, or his heirs, and the uninsured
motorist. 135
In Orpustan v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co.,1s6 the court addressed the issue of whether a finding of
130. CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2(f) (West 1988 & Supp. 1996).
131. See id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. § 11580.2(f).
136. 500 P.2d 1119 (Cal. 1972).
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physical contact could be made by an arbitrator. 137 In Orpus-
tan, a motorist who had been injured when he drove off the
road to avoid a collision with an unidentified vehicle sued his
own insurer to compel arbitration under the uninsured mo-
torist provisions of his policy.1 3 8 He wanted to arbitrate the
insurer's denial of coverage based on a lack of physical con-
tact with the unknown vehicle.
139
The trial court in Orpustan found that there was no
physical contact and therefore ruled that State Farm was not
obligated to pay uninsured motorist benefits. 140 The Califor-
nia Supreme Court reversed. 41 It held that where the arbi-
tration provisions regarding uninsured motorist coverage in
an insurance policy are sufficiently comprehensive to include
the question of whether the vehicle which caused the accident
was an uninsured vehicle, it is for the arbitrator and not the
court to make that determination. 42 The court further ex-
plained that "the parties contemplated expeditious resolution
of disputes between them arising under the uninsured motor-
ist coverage through the medium of arbitration, and that all
such disputes should be so decided."
143
In Mayflower Insurance Co. v. Pellegrino, 1 4 the court
held that the arbitration provisions of Insurance Code section
11580.2(f) relate only to disputes between the insured and in-
surer.145 Pellegrino involved an interpleader action in which
the insured driver was involved in an automobile accident
caused by an uninsured driver.' 46 The insured's passenger
was killed as a result of the collision.' 47 The insurer, uncer-
tain as to who was entitled to the proceeds of the uninsured
motorist policy, deposited the funds with the court.148 The
insured driver sought to compel arbitration under the arbi-
tration clause of his policy.
149
137. Orpustan, 500 P.2d at 1119.
138. Id. at 1120.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1123.
142. Orpustan, 500 P.2d at 1121.
143. Id.
144. 261 Cal. Rptr. 224 (Ct. App. 1989).
145. Pellegrino, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 228.
146. Id. at 225.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 226.
149. Id.
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In Pellegrino, the court recognized a strong public policy
favoring arbitration as an expeditious and economical means
of dispute resolution. 150 However, the court noted that there
is no public policy requiring arbitration of disputes when the
parties have not agreed to arbitrate or when no statute had
made the dispute arbitrable. 5 '
The court further explained that Insurance Code section
11580.2(f) indicated a legislative intent to require arbitration
only of disputes between insureds and insurers. 152 Conse-
quently, arbitration is mandated only for insurer/insured
disagreements.
The injured insured is entitled to recover uninsured mo-
torist benefits only if he or she is legally entitled to recover
from the uninsured motorist. 15 3 The issue of the uninsured
motorist's liability must first be determined.1'5 Insurance
Code section 11580.2(f) requires only that the determination
of both the right to recover and the amount of recovery be by
agreement between the insured and the insurer or, in the
event of disagreement, by arbitration. 155
G. Subrogation
The subrogation section of section 11580.2 provides that
the insurer paying a claim under uninsured motorist cover-
age is subrogated to the rights of the insured to whom such
claim was paid and against any person legally liable for that
injury or death, to the limits that the payment made. 156 This
section does nothing more than transfer an insured's negli-
gence claim to the insurer.
In addition to statutory provisions providing for the in-
sured's subrogation rights under section 11580.2(g), policies
include a provision that the insurer's right to subrogation in-
clude payments made by the insurer under the uninsured
motorist coverage. 157 Policies are now frequently written in
simplified English rather than the sometimes difficult to un-
150. Pellegrino, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 228.
151. Id. at 229.
152. Id.
153. CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2(f) (West 1988 & Supp. 1996).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. § 11580.2(g).
157. Id.
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derstand "legalese" formerly used. For example, a typical
subrogation clause may include the following:
If we (the insurer) make a payment under the uninsured
motor vehicle coverage, we have the right to recover the
amount of our payment from any person legally responsi-
ble for the loss. You (the insured) must transfer all rights
to recover to us, execute all legal papers we need, and not
harm our rights to recover from the responsible party.
In West American Insurance Co. v. Chalk,158 the court
held that under the subrogation section, which provides that
an insurer can bring an action against an uninsured motorist
within three years from the date it paid uninsured motorist
benefits to its insured, the insurer was entitled to assert a
claim against the uninsured motorist. 159 The court allowed
this even though the insured was barred from doing so be-
cause of the insured's shorter one-year statute of
limitations.160
In Chalk, the court explained that the special period of
limitations applicable solely to the subrogation claims of an
insurer take precedence over a statute of limitations applica-
ble to personal injury claims.1 61 In their decision, the court
emphasized that the three-year statute of limitations is not
an unconstitutional denial of equal protection, because the
classification bears a rational relationship to a conceivable
state purpose. 162 This purpose is to permit insurers, who are
required to write insurance based on the risk of their in-
sureds being injured by uninsured drivers, to seek reimburse-
ment from those drivers and protect the insurer's subrogation
rights from being barred.1
6 3
The purpose of the extended limitation period provided
in section 11580.2(g) is to protect the subrogation rights of
the insurer, which under certain circumstances could be
barred even before the right has accrued.' 64
158. 261 Cal. Rptr. 837 (Ct. App. 1989).
159. Chalk, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 840.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 841.
163. Id.
164. Chalk, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 841.
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H. The Effect of Settlement or Judgment With the Person
Liable Without the Insurer's Consent
The uninsured motorist coverage provided in Insurance
Code section 11580.2 does not apply to "bodily injury of the
insured with respect to which the insured or his representa-
tive shall, without the written consent of the insurer, make
any settlement with or prosecute to judgment any action
against any person who may be legally liable therefor. " 165
The purpose of this provision is to protect the insurer's
general subrogation rights and to prevent double recovery by
the insured. However, the exemption from coverage does not
apply if the insurer arbitrarily withholds its consent to ajudgment or settlement. 166 The burden is on the insured to
prove that consent was arbitrarily withheld. Furthermore,
the exception does not apply if the insurer commits an antici-
patory breach of the policy by denying coverage without
justification. 167
In Terzian v. California Casualty Indemnity Ex-
change, 6 8 an insurer's conduct was held to prevent applica-
tion of the "unconsented judgment" exclusion.1 69 In this case,
the insurer's repeated failures to respond to the insured's de-
mands for arbitration were held tantamount to a denial of
liability under the policy and constituted a breach thereof. 170
The insurer's intervention in the insured's litigation
against the person liable can also defeat the insurer's right to
invoke the "unconsented judgment" exclusion. In Safeco In-
surance Co. v. Folen, 171 Safeco's insureds brought suit in fed-
eral district court against two other drivers after being in-jured in a three-car accident in Alabama. 172 One of the
adverse drivers was insured, the other was not.173
Safeco intervened in that action and sought a determina-
tion of its liability against the uninsured driver. 174 It argued
that its own insureds, instead of the uninsured motorist, had
165. CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2(c)(3) (West 1988 & Supp. 1996).
166. Id. § 790.03(h) (West 1993).
167. Id.
168. 117 Cal. Rptr. 284 (Ct. App. 1974).
169. Terzian, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 290.
170. Id.
171. 173 Cal. Rptr. 23 (Ct. App. 1981).
172. Safeco Ins. Co., 173 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
173. Id. at 27.
174. Id.
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been negligent. 175 The federal court rejected all of Safeco's
arguments. 176 After Safeco's insureds recovered both from
the insured driver and from Safeco under the uninsured mo-
torist provision of the policy, Safeco sued its own insureds in
California, arguing that the insureds had breached their con-
tract with Safeco by not protecting its subrogation rights
against the two tortfeasors responsible for the Alabama
accident. 177
The court held that Safeco was entitled to intervene in
Alabama as a matter of right in order to defeat its insured's
claims for uninsured motorist benefits.17 8 However, all of
Safeco's claims against its insureds were barred by res judi-
cata because such rights had merged in the judgment against
it issuing from the Alabama court.1 79 Therefore, Safeco could
not later seek relief in the California action against its
insureds. 8 0
In collecting $30,000 from the insured driver, and from
Safeco under the uninsured motorist provision, the insureds
were simply exercising a right conferred by the judgment.' 8 '
By intervening in the Alabama action, the insurer waived its
right to rely on policy provisions that would have otherwise
barred the insureds from proceeding to judgment. 8 2 In addi-
tion, the court held that by attempting to re-litigate the is-
sues, the insurer had breached the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing under the policy.'
8 3
Recently, there has been an increase in litigation regard-
ing the unconsented judgment exclusion itself, and also its
application to underinsured motorist claims. As it stands to-
day, the "consent to settle" requirement set forth in section
11580.2(c)(3) is not applicable to individuals seeking underin-
sured motorist benefits. This issue will be discussed in fur-
ther detail in the next section.
175. Id. at 28.
176. Id.
177. Safeco Ins. Co., 173 Cal. Rptr. at 29.
178. Id. at 30.
179. Id. at 32.
180. Id. at 30.
181. Id. at 29.
182. Safeco Ins. Co., 173 Cal. Rptr. at 29.
183. Id. at 30.
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IV. THE Co-EXISTENCE OF UNINSURANCE AND
UNDERINSURANCE
A. Underinsurance Explained
As stated above, an uninsured motor vehicle is a vehicle
which has no bodily injury liability insurance at the time of
an accident.'1 4 On the other hand, an underinsured motor
vehicle is a vehicle that is insured, but for an amount that is
less than the uninsured motorist limits carried on the vehicle
of the injured person.18 5
Under the underinsurance provisions, 1 6 all policies that
include uninsured motorist coverage for bodily injury must
also include underinsured motorist coverage.' 8 7 Underin-
sured motorist coverage must be offered with limits at least
equivalent to the uninsured motorist coverage. 88 Although
the limits for underinsured motorist coverage can exceed the
limits for uninsured motorist coverage, both uninsured and
underinsured motorist coverage must be offered as a single
coverage. '
8 9
Insurance Code section 11580.2 specifically provides that
underinsured motorist coverage does not apply to any bodily
injury until the limits of all bodily injury liability policies
have been exhausted by payment of judgments or settle-
ments. 190 Similarly, section 11580.2(p)(4) provides that the
"maximum liability of the insurer providing underinsured
motorist coverage may not exceed the insured's underinsured
motorist coverage limits, less the amount paid to the insured
by or for any person or entity held legally liable for the
injury."191
This complicated language basically means that an in-
sured cannot recover underinsured motorist benefits under
his or her own policy until the liability limits of the policy
insuring those parties responsible for the injuries have been
exhausted. Nonetheless, an insurer who provides underin-
sured motorist benefits for bodily injury to its insured is enti-
184. See discussion supra part I.
185. CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2(p)(2) (West 1988 & Supp. 1996).
186. Id. § 11580.2(p).
187. Id. § 11580.2(p)(7).
188. Id. § 11580.2(n).
189. Id.
190. Id. § 11580.2(p)(3).
191. Id. § 11580.2(p)(4).
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tled to a credit or reimbursement to the extent the insured
has received payments from the owner of the underinsured
vehicle.' 92 This effectively precludes double recovery by the
injured party.
B. Statutory Provision and Judicial Development in
Conflicts in Uninsurance and Underinsurance
Provisions
Insurance Code section 11580.2(p) explicitly provides
that "[i]f the provisions of this subdivision conflict with subdi-
visions (a) through (o), the provisions of this subdivision shall
prevail."193
Subdivision (p) deals specifically with underinsurance. 194
Subdivisions (a) through (o) address uninsurance. 195 The
majority of litigation in this area arises in determining (1)
when a conflict arises between the subdivisions; and (2) if a
real conflict exists, can the subdivisions co-exist.
In Lopez v. Allstate Insurance Co., 196 both the insured
and the person responsible for the insured's injuries had lia-
bility limits of $15,000 per person and $30,000 per occur-
rence. 197 The court held that section 11580.2(p)(2) clearly re-
stricts underinsured motorist benefits to cases in which the
tortfeasor's liability limits are less than the underinsurance
limits of the injured person. 198
Thus, underinsured motorist coverage is not the
equivalent of excess coverage.199 The insurer providing un-
derinsured motorist coverage never pays the full amount of
the coverage, but only pays the difference between its own
insured's policy limits and amounts paid by or on behalf of
the person liable to the insured.2
0 0
It is irrelevant whether the insured is made whole by the
sum of those payments.20 ' In Malone v. Nationwide Mutual
192. Id. § 11580. 2(p)(5).
193. Id. § 11580.2(p).
194. Id.
195. See id. § 11580.2(a)-(o).
196. 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 463 (Ct. App. 1993).
197. Lopez, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 464.
198. Id. at 466.
199. See Malone v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 263 Cal. Rptr. 499 (Ct. App.
1989).
200. Id. at 500.
201. Id.
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Insurance Co.,202 the court ruled that the first party insurer,
which had already paid its insured's underinsured motorist
benefits, was entitled to reimbursement for all amounts that
the insured's spouse had recovered from the responsible
20party's insurer. 03 These amounts included those which she
received as widow of the deceased, as an heir, and an addi-
tional amount she received for her own mental damages from
the same source.2 °4
Unless the tortfeasor's vehicle qualifies as an underin-
sured vehicle under the policy, the insured's underinsurance
coverage is never triggered.20 5 Thus, if the tortfeasor's vehi-
cle has enough insurance to qualify as "insured," the insured
cannot recover underinsured motorist benefits even though
the limit of the tortfeasor's policy is inadequate to compen-
sate the insured for all his or her injuries.20 6 Because the
tortfeasor's policy in Elwood had limits equal to the insured's
own policy, the vehicle driven by the responsible party was
not considered "underinsured."20 7 The claimant was not enti-
tled to recover underinsured motorist benefits.208
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Mes-
20singer, 09 the court dealt with a situation where the vehicle
driven by the responsible party carried $300,000 single lim-
its, and the claimant's vehicle, insured with State Farm, car-
ried $100,000 per personl$300,000 per accident limits. 210 The
insured claimant argued that its damages should be determi-
native of the availability of underinsured motorist benefits.211
However, the court held that the responsible party's motor
vehicle was not underinsured.2 12
The court further held that underinsured motorist cover-
age is not triggered by the amount of the claimant's damages,
but rather by a comparison of the limits of the responsible
party's limits and the underinsured motorist limits of the
202. 263 Cal. Rptr. 499 (Ct. App. 1989).
203. Malone, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 501.
204. Id. at 502.
205. Elwood v. AID Ins. Co., 880 F.2d 204, 206 (9th Cir. 1989).
206. Id. at 209.
207. Id. at 206.
208. Id.
209. 283 Cal. Rptr. 493 (Ct. App. 1991).
210. Messinger, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 495.
211. Id. at 499.
212. Id. at 501.
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claimant's policy.2 1 3 Finally, the court held that the fact that
an insured claimant might be unable to collect the full value
of its claim because of the existence of multiple claimants was
not a problem for the courts to resolve, but should be left to
the legislature.2 14
A tortfeasor's vehicle is not necessarily considered under-
insured just because there are multiple claimants with
claims that exceed the available coverage. In Schwieterman
v. Mercury Casualty Co.,215 the court held that the responsi-
ble party was not an underinsured motorist simply because
there were multiple claimants.2 1 These claimants had so de-
pleted the available coverage that the funds actually avail-
able to pay any individual insured's claim were less than the
underinsured motorist limits of coverage under the claim-
ant's own policy.
217
For example, assume that an individual's own policy pro-
vides him with $15,000 underinsured motorist benefits. If
the responsible party's auto liability policy provides $30,000
per accident, and there are three claimants with equal inju-
ries each totaling $15,000, the coverage available will be di-
vided equally amongst them and each will receive $10,000.
Consequently, the funds available to pay each injured person
are less than the underinsured motorist limits of coverage of
the insured's own policy. In this situation, the tortfeasor's ve-
hicle will not be considered to be underinsured and the claim-
ant's underinsured motorist coverage would not be triggered.
Underinsured motorist benefits may not be available
when the insured is the sole person at fault. In Royal Insur-
ance Co. v. Cole,218 the court held that an injured passenger,
in an accident where the driver of the vehicle was solely re-
sponsible, could not recover from the underinsured motorist
policy provisions of the driver's policy.219 The insured vehicle
was not an underinsured motor vehicle within the meaning of
section 11580.2(p)(2). 220
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. 280 Cal. Rptr. 804 (Ct. App. 1991).
216. Schwieterman, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 805.
217. Id. at 806.
218. 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 660 (Ct. App. 1993).
219. Royal Ins. Co., 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 667.
220. Id. at 666.
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The court explained that the statute clearly assumes
that there is another negligent vehicle involved in the acci-
dent with liability insurance less than the uninsured motor-
ist limits carried on the vehicle of the injured person.221
C. Highly Litigated Provisions
The following three provisions under Insurance Code sec-
tion 11580.2 have resulted in litigation because they tend to
conflict with subdivision (p) regarding underinsurance motor-
ist coverage: (1) the consent to settle exclusion in section
11580.2(c)(3); (2) the subrogation rights of the insurer in sec-
tion 11580.2(g); and (3) the determination for the accrual of a
cause of action under section 11580.2(i).
In Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. Macri,222 the court held
that although Insurance Code section 11580.2(g) grants an
automobile insurer subrogation rights to an insured who has
paid uninsured motorist benefits, an insurer has no subroga-
tion rights in the context of underinsured motorist
coverage.223
The court in Macri explained that when faced with an
uninsured claim, the insurer must be made aware of any po-
tential judgment or settlement in order to protect its subroga-
tion rights and to prevent double recovery.2 2 4 However, there
is no need for such protection in the underinsured motorist
context.225 This is because the underinsured carrier is not re-
quired to pay UIM benefits to its insured until the insured
has exhausted the limits of the tortfeasor's liability policies
by either settling the claim, or obtaining a judgment against
the person at fault and submitting proof of payment to the
insurer.226 Under these circumstances, there is no danger of
double recovery.227
In Macri, the California Supreme Court addressed the is-
sue of whether the requirement of the insurer's consent
under Insurance Code section 11580.2(c)(3) was applicable to
underinsured motorist claims. 228 The court held that section
221. Id. at 663.
222. 842 P.2d 112 (Cal. 1992).
223. Macri, 842 P.2d at 118.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 119.
228. Macri, 842 P.2d at 119.
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11580.2(c)(3), requiring an insured to obtain the consent of
the insurer before settling with an uninsured motorist, was
inapplicable to underinsured motorist claims.229 The court
reasoned that the purpose of the consent to settle require-
ment of section 11580.2(c)(3) was to protect the insurer's sub-
rogation rights.23 0 Since the court concluded that an insurer
that provides underinsured motorist benefits has no subroga-
tion rights against the underinsured motorist, section
11580.2(c)(3) does not apply to underinsured motorist
coverage.23'
In a more recent case, Arrasmith v. State Farm Insur-
ance Co.,232 the court addressed the issue of whether the ac-
crual provisions of Insurance Code section 11580.2(i) should
be applied to an underinsurance claim.233 The court held
that section 11580.2(i) does not conflict with section
11580.2(p) and may therefore be applied in the context of an
underinsured motorist claim.23 4 Section 11580.2(i) provides
that an uninsured motorist claim does not accrue unless,
within one year from the date of accident, suit for bodily in-
jury has been filed against an uninsured motorist, agreement
as to the amount due under the policy has been concluded, or
the insured has formally instituted arbitration
proceedings.235
The court in Arrasmith explained that although section
11580.2(p)(3) bars underinsured motorist coverage until set-
tlement or judgment and payment from all other insurance
policies, it does not preclude perfection of an underinsured
motorist claim.23 s Since personal injury actions must be filed
within one year of injury, or within one year of the accident,
the insured must either settle any claims against the respon-
sible party or file suit against him.23 ' The filing of suit is it-
self sufficient to protect the insured's right to underinsured
benefits.238
229. Id.
230. Id. at 119-20.
231. Id. at 120.
232. 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 53 (Ct. App. 1994).
233. Arrasmith, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 56.
234. Id.
235. CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2(i) (West 1988 & Supp. 1996).
236. Arrasmith, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 56.
237. Id. at 57.
238. Id.
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The ruling in Arrasmith was challenged in Quintano v.
Mercury Casualty Co.2" 9 Quintano held that section
11580.2(i) was not intended to apply to underinsured motor-
ist provisions.24 ° In this case, the court explained that sec-
tion 11580.2(p) requires that the insurance policy of the at-
fault-party be exhausted by payment of judgments or settle-
ments first, and that there be proof of payment to the insurer
in order for underinsured motorist coverage to apply.24 1 That
requirement is the only condition precedent to underin-
surance coverage contemplated by the legislature.24 2
The court in Quintano further explained that since un-
derinsured motorist coverage is inapplicable until the person
at fault has paid the insured, none of the preconditions to a
claim would have been met under section 11580.2(i) except
the filing of suit against the person at fault.243 However,
since the claimant had settled with the person at fault, the
filing of suit was only a formality which should not have been
required. 24 Thus, the insured's action against its insurer
had accrued upon the insurer's refusal to process the claim,
the last element essential to the cause of action.245
As Quintano is currently under review by the California
Supreme Court, it is not binding. Therefore, the ruling in Ar-
rasmith, which holds that section 11580.2(i) applies to under-
insured motorist claims, remains the legal precedent on this
issue.
V. CONCLUSION
California's uninsured and underinsured motorist law is
the product of a dense and complex statute. It is indeed un-
fortunate that a statute that is so frequently referenced is so
infrequently understood. However, given the purpose of the
law, and the need for effective protections against fraud, it is
probably as well crafted as one could hope.
What remains then is the need for the practitioner to
fully familiarize him or herself with its provisions and subse-
239. 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 900 (Ct. App.), reh'g granted, 884 P.2d 985 (Cal. 1994).
240. Quintano, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 905.
241. Id. at 904.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 905, 906.
244. Id. at 905.
245. Quintano, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 905.
748 [Vol. 36
1996] MOTORIST LAW 749
quent interpretations. Particularly, one must be sure that all
the elements necessary to perfect the right to recovery are in
place. With proper attention, section 11580.2 serves its pur-
pose extremely effectively. Handled sloppily, it can trap the
unwary practitioner and bar recovery.

